University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science

6-15-2017

Policy Spillover and Gun Migration: The Interstate Dynamics of
State Gun Control Policies
Michael Coates
Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
University of Rhode Island, shanna_pearson@uri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/psc_facpubs

The University of Rhode Island Faculty have made this article openly available.
Please let us know how Open Access to this research benefits you.
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.

Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable towards Open Access
Policy Articles, as set forth in our Terms of Use.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Coates, M. and Pearson‐Merkowitzz, S. (2017), Policy Spillover and Gun Migration: The Interstate
Dynamics of State Gun Control Policies*. Social Science Quarterly, 98: 500-512. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12422
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12422

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at DigitalCommons@URI. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

Policy Spillover and Gun migration: The interstate dynamics of state gun control policies
Michael Coates
Ph. D Candidate, University of Maryland, College Park
Azhain@gmail.com
Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz1
Associate Professor, University of Rhode Island
shannapearsonuri@gmail.com

Abstract: Objective: In this paper we examine state policy spillover by examining how differences
between state gun control policies affect the migration of guns between states with lax regulatory
environments for gun purchasing and licensing to states with relatively strict regulatory
environments. Method: We test our hypothesis using data from 2007-2013 from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on the presence of criminal guns and from the Brady Campaign
on state gun control laws. Results: Our results suggest that a large proportion of criminal guns in
states with strict gun control laws were originally purchased in states with fewer regulations. There
is a direct correlation between where criminal guns were originally purchased, where criminal
guns are uncovered, and the strength of state gun laws. Conclusions: State gun control laws appear
to make purchasing a gun through legal frameworks more difficult and shift the “market” for
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criminal guns to purchasing locations across state borders where purchasing is easier. Gun control
laws appear, therefore, to be affected by policy spillover.
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In December of 2012, a 23 year-old college student named David Lewisbey was arrested
by FBI agents for trafficking 43 firearms to a government informant. Of the incident, Assistant
U.S. Attorney Christopher Parente said that Lewisbey would travel to Indiana and purchase a
“duffel bag” full of weapons and then sell them on the streets of the “worst neighborhoods of
Chicago” (Sweeney & Meisner, 2013). Why would Lewisbey have traveled to Indiana to
purchase guns to sell in Illinois? The gun laws in Indiana, compared to those in Illinois, make it
very easy to purchase firearms without a background check or any paperwork that would trace
the weapons back to the purchaser if they are used in a crime. As a result, it is fairly easy to
purchase guns in low regulation Indiana for use or distribution in high-regulation Illinois.
It is a well-established phenomenon that the borders within the United States of America
are porous and unrestrictive. While nations can to some extent control the laws of supply and
demand by curtailing supply through regulations and tariffs, cities and states share unregulated
borders where goods and people flow easily across and between jurisdictions. As a result, states
cannot effectively regulate the supply-side mechanisms behind many issues they wish to address.
The reality of this situation means that states often experience “policy spillover” where the
difference between state policies affect the ability of legislators in each state to effectively
implement regulations (e.g. Baicker, 2005; Beard, et al., 1997; Stehr, 2007; Sigman, 2005).
In this article we test a case of potential spillover-effects between states to examine how
policy diversity in the arena of gun control impacts where guns are originally purchased and
where they are eventually confiscated by police. We employ data on gun control laws from the
Brady Campaign and data on the location of gun confiscations and their original purchase
location from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Our data
suggest that in states with strong gun laws there is an increased likelihood that a confiscated gun
1

will have been originally purchased in a state with weaker gun laws and that a larger proportion
of the confiscated guns will have been originally purchased out of state compared to states with
weaker gun laws. Our data and findings suggest that policies attempting to regulate the
availability of guns are susceptible to policy spillover from other states as a result of the
differentiation between state gun control laws around the country.
What we know about gun control policies
Gun control provides an interesting opportunity to examine spillover effects because of
the variation between states in gun regulations. Current research on gun control is very limited
and finds mixed evidence in terms of the effectiveness of state and local gun control laws. Kleck
and Patterson (1993) conducted a meta-survey of 29 studies investigating the effects of gun laws
on gun crime. Of the studies, four found that gun control lowers crime, eight had mixed results,
and seventeen found no effect. Of the research that investigated state-gun laws, only two found
evidence that gun control laws reduced crime while eleven were either inconclusive or found no
evidence that gun laws predicted lower gun crime. More recent studies have reinforced these
findings. While firearm regulations were found to decrease the incidence rate of suicide among
men (Andres & Hempstead, 2011), studies investigating the federal assault weapons ban found
either small crime reducing effects (Koper and Roth, 2001) or mixed effects (Lott, 1998).
Likewise, Duggan et al. (2011) find that state-level gun show regulations had little effect on state
firearm deaths. Ludwig and Cook (2000) investigated background check policies and found
small crime-reducing effects. A relatively large literature now exists on concealed carry permits
but the effects are likewise mixed (e.g. Kovandzic et al., 2005; Hood & Neeley, 2000; Moody,
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2001; Ayres and Donohue, 2003).2 However, Kwon and Baack (2005) employ a sophisticated
measurement of the totality of a state’s gun laws, and find that multiple laws directed towards the
same end (e.g. gun control) may be effective in reducing gun crime and gun stocks. Even then,
however, socioeconomic factors remain the strongest predictors of gun violence.
Policy Spillover and the Case of Gun Control
Various studies have explored the impact of spillover effects impeding or otherwise
affecting the effectiveness of state regulations. When states have regulated air pollution,
polluting agents have been found to move to a less well-regulated neighboring state. As a result,
state level air quality controls are seen as ineffective when there is state-by-state variation in
regulations because air pollution simply travels back across the border (Lester, 1986; Lowry,
1992; Sigman, 2005). The same argument has been made in the application of teen drinking
laws aimed at curbing drunk driving. Saffer and Grossman (1987) found that when state
drinking age laws varied from state to state, teen drunk driving increased in states with higher
drinking ages when the drinking age was lower in a neighboring state because the combination
of the two policies encouraged driving further in order to consume alcohol. Similarly, Baltagi
and Li (2006) find that interstate availability and taxation of liquor leads to a significant amount
of out-of-state sales and when states relax availability and/or reduce taxation, own-state sales
increase. These findings call into question data that suggest that drinking increases when taxes
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There are also several studies on who supports and applies for concealed weapons permits that suggest

that those who support these laws do not necessarily apply for them and that concealed permits are held
mostly by middle class whites who live in low crime areas (e.g. Hood & Neeley, 2000; Ghent & Grant,
2015).
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are increased (or vice versa). Rather, the data suggests that the market simply adjusts by shifting
out-of-state but that drinking remains stagnant. In both these cases, environmental regulation and
drunk driving prevention, the policies of neighboring states “spilled-over,” effectively nullifying
the stronger regulations.
We argue that this is also likely true of guns, particularly those used for violence and
criminal activities. When a person wants a gun for the purposes of committing a crime, the
availability of guns at the local level may be only partially effective in preventing the crime if the
person has the ability to cross state lines. Supply side gun control laws decrease the ease with
which someone bent on committing a crime of passion can purchase a firearm, and therefore
likely decrease the rate of gun-related crimes and gun-related death by increasing the costs of
gun purchasing. For example, “cooling off” laws are intended to help guard against impulsive
acts of violence and suicide. Someone in Chicago may be able to simply drive to Indiana to
purchase a gun to kill oneself or someone else in a crime of passion. The drive time from
downtown Chicago to the closest gun retailer in Indiana is, by our estimate (using Google maps),
one hour with no traffic. This means circumventing a “cooling off” law in Illinois would still
require a 2 hour-minimum drive for someone to get to the store, purchase a gun, drive back and
find their victim. The other choice, of course, would be for the person to purchase the gun on the
black market or attain one from an acquaintance who has already legally purchased the weapon.3

3

The theory as presented makes no assumptions about the transference of guns from one state to another

through the normal movement of legal gun owners. For example, if someone purchases a firearm in
Colorado and later moves to Rhode Island it is possible that the strength of gun laws in one state versus
another has little to no bearing on the movement of that weapon. We chose to control for this effect by
including a variable of population change, assuming that states with higher rates of population change
4

Again, this requires locating a black-market dealer or an acquaintance who owns a gun s/he is
willing to hand over. While both of these may be viable options, the increased burden of either
alternative method could prevent many crimes.
However, guns are also used for protection against criminals, for carrying out criminal
activity such as robberies in which a gun may end up being discharged even if that was not the
original purpose of the criminal activity, or for murders that are non-impassioned. Supply side
gun regulations aim to decrease gun deaths that arise from these crimes as well. However, we
argue here that when there is demand for guns, gun purchasing will follow market constraints
similar to the ways in which studies have found that alcohol purchases shift as a result of alcohol
regulation (e.g. Saffer and Grossman, 1987; Baltagi and Li, 2006): guns that eventually end up
in crime scenes are more likely to be purchased in states with less regulatory barriers when a
state increases the stringency of its gun control laws (e.g. the supply-market will shift out of
state). This is not to say that gun regulations will not decrease gun purchases, or gun crime, but
that to the extent gun crime continues, it is likely to follow the market constraints out of state.
The connection between firearms regulation and trafficking has been noted by a few
recent studies employing city-level data, single state case studies, or inter-country data. Weil
and Knox (1996) in their investigation of the passage of a Virginia gun control law found that the
passage of a law limiting firearms purchases to one per month was correlated with a decrease in
the number of guns purchased in Virginia which were subsequently used in crimes in the
northeastern corridor. While this case supports our assertion about the role of permissive states

receive more firearms simply through their owners moving but the results were not statistically significant
and were left out of the final model.
5

in supplying guns to more restrictive states, the authors did not test if the inverse relationship
was also present, and the data is limited to a single state. Webster, et al (2001a) compare 25
cities over the course of a single year and discovered that some of the crime reducing effects of
firearm regulations were mitigated in cities near states that lacked similarly restrictive laws. In
another study using data from the same cities between 2000 and 2002, the same authors posit
that increases in firearms regulations could profoundly lessen intrastate firearm trafficking
(2001b). Unfortunately, these two studies examine a limited number of locations and only 2
years of data. Perhaps most importantly for this study, Dube et al. (2013) employ a unique
natural experiment to investigate the connection between the expiration of the U.S. Federal
Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) and gun violence in Mexico. Their data suggest that Mexican
towns near the U.S. boarder experienced increases in homicide and gun related homicide and
criminal gun confiscations after 2004 (the expiration of the AWB).
Based on this theory of policy spillover and interstate regulatory dynamics, we expect
states with strong gun laws to be more likely to “import” guns from states with weaker laws for
use in criminal activity. By contrast, we expect states that have the most relaxed gun laws to
“export” more guns to states that have stronger gun laws. Formally stated, our hypothesis is as
follows: As a state’s gun control laws increase, the proportion of guns used in crimes originally
purchased out-of-state will increase.
Data and Methodology
To test our hypothesis, we require an indicator of how many guns move between states.
Since 1968, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has kept records
on firearms taken from crime scenes traced to their point of purchase. For years 2006-2013, the
ATF has made publically available its reports on traces for each state, including the District of
6

Columbia and Puerto Rico.4 Using this data, we calculated our dependent variable as the ratio of
exports to imports of guns used in crimes using a ratio of a state’s gun “imports” (the guns that
were originally purchased out of state but confiscated in state) to “exports” (the guns that were
originally purchased in the state but were confiscated in another state). 5 For any two states k and
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Data for each state is available at the ATF website, here: http://www.atf.gov/statistics/index.html. This

count includes the number of guns that were able to be traced to their original purchase state.
5

There are several important caveats to this data. The selection process in which guns end up in this

dataset may not be random because it is up to the individual police department to request a trace on a gun
and the decision making of police as to which guns to trace is unknown. As a result, there may be nonrandom error but it is impossible to know how much of the dataset is affected, and in what way. However,
there is no systematic reason that we can think of that the selection method would necessarily bias our
results unless police decide on traces because they believe the gun was purchased in another state. If this
were the case, we would expect to see little difference between states in the percentage of guns that come
from out-of-state. In addition, one would think that if this was the case, we would see a majority of the
traces being from out-of-state, however, in the ATF data most guns are originally purchased from in-state
sources. While this is a critical caveat to this study, the data is the best available and novel in its ability to
track criminal guns across states. That stated, there are formal constraints on gun traces. The ATF does
not trace every gun due to the overwhelming number of confiscated guns in the U.S. and traces are based
on priority and urgency (although departments can request a trace simply for data collection purposes).
Traces are justified as a priority if the weapon was found or used in an Assault, bank robbery, kidnapping,
murder/suicide, rape or a terrorist act or threat of terrorism and the police department needs the trace to
hold the suspect, provide probable cause or protect public safety etc. Further, the authors learned after
consulting with agents within the ATF that the Department has an internal regulation to only perform
traces on weapons that are a part of an ongoing investigation. There is no cost to police departments to
7

𝑡
j, we write the (recovered) imports from state j to k in year t as 𝐹𝐴𝑗,𝑘
. This includes all of the

guns that originated in state j but were recovered in state k ≠ j in year t. We can then define the
import ratio for state j in year t as:

𝐼𝑀𝑗𝑡 =

𝑡
∑𝑘≠𝑗 𝐹𝐴𝑗,𝑘

∑𝑗≠𝑘 𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑘,𝑗

We also ran our models using several other versions of the dependent variable, for
example, a simple percent of guns that came from out of state as well as the inverse (percent of
guns sent to other states). These variations did not affect the substance of our results. We prefer
the ratio because it can account for both the relationship of imports to exports within one
dependent variable. Since our hypothesis is that increasing gun control measures will both
decrease exports and increase imports and decreasing gun regulations would increase exports and
simultaneously decrease exports, this dependent variable measures both of these factors while
also standardizing across states. Despite the strength of the ATF’s reports as a unique data
source, it has limitations due to ATF reporting format. From 2006-2011 the data for each state
only list the 15-16 states that sent the most guns to that state. This means that some states are

submit a trace request, and requests are usually completed within 4 days. The form to request a trace is
two pages long and available online at: https://www.atf.gov/file/11771/download. For these reasons, we
are confident that officers are most likely not constrained in tracing weapons they otherwise would
because of scarcity of resources, or other systematic reasons that would bias the dataset towards the result
we find.
8

excluded that did “send” guns to another state because they sent fewer guns than 16 other states.6
This skews the analysis towards larger states which can reliably appear in the top 15 states7.
Luckily, for years 2012 and 2013 the ATF published gun trace data for the first time
which includes the data for every gun traced recovered from a crime scene for every state for all
states (not just the top 15 supply states); thus, in this data, we do not lose smaller states and are
able to include all the data in our analysis. In order to harness both the benefits of time-series
data and the full data that is available in the most recent two years, we run our analysis on both
types of data. 8
Independent Variables. To measure the strength of gun laws on a state-by-state basis,
we utilize data from the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.9 Since 2007, the Brady
Campaign has collected a “scorecard” for each state based on the strength of the state’s gun laws.
As the Brady Campaign has evolved, its scorecard has changed so that different types of gun

6

For example, in the limited dataset for 2012 guns recovered from California that had been purchased in

Alabama are not counted because Alabama is not a top 15 supply states for California. Unfortunately, it is
the best data available.
7

Hawaii is excluded from the analysis because it enjoys significant barriers to trafficking that no other

state has, namely over 2000 miles of ocean.
8

The data is also left-skewed. To deal with this, we replicate all of our models utilizing the natural log of

the dependent variables. Reviewer Appendix 1 shows the change in the distribution of the dependent
variables as a result of converting to a natural log.
9

Access to each year is limited to special request, but the Brady campaign current scorecard is available

here: http://bradycampaign.org/?q=programs/million-mom-march/state-gun-laws
9

laws are used in the scorecard each year. In addition, the Brady Campaign weights its score
based on an evolving standard of which laws are considered more/less important. To deal with
this, instead of using the raw score provided by the Brady Campaign, each year of the scorecard
was reweighted based on the weighting scheme applied in 2011 (the last year that it issued its
score card in this format), and any law from the score which was not tracked over the entirety of
the period was dropped. As a result, while the original score was out of 100, the reweighted
scores have a maximum of 84. The intended result is that a state should have the same score in
2011 as it had in 2007 if no changes in the law occurred. This method was employed to protect
the analysis from being skewed by changes in the scoring standard over time instead of changes
in the law. 10 We also created a score where the strength of each law is set equal to 1, in this
measurement procedure, no individual law is assumed to have a greater or lesser impact on gun
trafficking than any other. We ran our models using all three versions of the score (the original
Brady Campaign score as reported for each year, the 2011-base weight score, and an unweighted
score). The substantive findings did not depend on which form of the Brady Campaign score we
employed. These models are available upon request; we present only the 2011-base weight score
here, which we refer to as the gun control regulation index in our models.
We also include the per capita number of federal licenses granted to both firearm sales
and manufacturing businesses to control for the presence (or lack thereof) of local market

10

Also, our analysis for 2012-2013 uses the same gun regulation score as 2011 because the Brady

Campaign drastically changed its report card format so that now states are not scored on a scale, and
instead are given an A-F grade which does not correlate well with the scorecard prior to 2012.
10

availability. The data on market licenses is only available from the ATF for the years 2010 to
2013. Thus, we report models including this variable only in a model limited to 2010-2013.11
A number of control variables are also included in the analysis.12 The violent crime rate
comes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) website.13 Total population estimates14
for each state across the six years examined in the study, as well as the level of urbanization, and
overall population density come from the U.S Census Bureau.15 In addition, we include a control
for the size, in square miles, of each state.16 We expect larger states to be less prone to importing
guns from other states as the cost of transportation and the likelihood of intervention will be
higher. Our expectations for urbanization and overall population density are less unidirectional.
On the one hand, we expect states with more densely populated urban areas to have higher
demand for guns, but if those guns are originally purchased in-state or out-of-state should be
reliant, to an extent, on the strength of the gun laws. Of course it is possible that the laws

11

We originally included manufacturing and licensing separately as two different independent variables.

However, they are highly correlated (.8), so we combined them into a single measure. Including them
separately does not change the results.
12

To protect against model confusion due to high-multicollinearity, correlations were tested between all

independent variables in the analysis, no relationship between the IVs are correlated above .5
13

Found here: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/crimestats

14

Population estimates are available here: http://www.census.gov/popest/index.html

15

The urbanization ratio was calculated by comparing the totaled population numbers from the urban

clusters page at the census. (http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb1250.html) with the population listed by the census for 2010.
16

Info is available at this link: http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc3-us-pt1.pdf
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themselves may just be stricter in places that experience higher levels of gun violence; however,
to not inflate the results based on demand for guns we include these measures in our models.
Finally, because of our ability to harness time-series and cross sectional data, we include
a lag term. While this is important for empirical reasons, we also believe this is an important
control for substantive reasons. Illegal gun sales are not random; there are most likely established
sellers and buyers. Thus, there is the chance that illegal markets would not be responsive to
changes in gun laws as there are established trade routes.
Bivariate Results
An anecdotal look at our data supports our hypothesis and gives a strong example of the
relationship we seek to understand. On its surface, there appears to be a relationship between the
strength of local gun laws and the rate of trafficking a state experiences, but certainly not
uniformly.
Table 1 shows the top 5 gun exporting states and their 3 largest customers.

On a case by

case basis, the flow of guns appears to be from states with weak laws to those with stronger ones,
with some exceptions. We also see evidence of geographic proximity and region affecting the
relationship.
As illustrated by the gun trafficking of David Lewisbey in the introduction of this article,
a compelling example can be made of the relationship between Indiana and Illinois: 63.3% of all
the guns that were originally purchased in Indiana but that were used in a crime in another state
were recovered in Illinois. Indiana is significantly less regulated than Illinois, scoring only a 4
on the regulation scale to Illinois’s 26, and the two share a substantial border.
[Table 1 about here]
12

The lower half of Table 1 presents the top 5 “market” states and their top “suppliers” for
2012. Like the previous table, while there are exceptions, the expectation that states with
stronger laws will have guns used in crimes that were originally purchased in states with weaker
gun laws once again holds. Connecticut, whose regulation scale scores a 55, is the 3rd strongest
in the nation behind California (72) and New Jersey (62). In Connecticut, for every 30 guns
recovered at a gun related crime, one gun is exported to a different state’s gun related crime.
While its regulation score is only slightly lower than its number one supplier, its next two
suppliers, which are further away, both have significantly weaker gun laws.
Multivariate Results
Table 2 presents a cross-sectional time series regression analysis for two models built out
of two datasets: the first dataset ranges from 2007 to 2013 and the second ranges from 2010 to
2013 and includes a control for the number of firearm manufacturing licenses in the state. Both
models, the years where every tracked weapon was reported by the ATF (2007-2013) and those
years where the ATF only reported the top sources for each state (2010-2013), employ crosssectional time series modeling and include a lagged dependent variable, random effects
estimates, and clustered standard errors by state. We present both models in their original form
and using the logged variables.17
[Table 2 about here]
As expected, the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant in three of the four
models. The size of the state is also statistically significant which suggests that one of the chief
17

We also checked to see if the outliers were driving the analysis by dropping these extreme outliers from

the data and running the models without them. Dropping the outliers did not change the results.
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factors of how guns are trafficked is convenience and that markets are still predominantly
regional forces. Also, the state population is correlated with the import ratio indicating that more
people results in a larger demand for guns from out of state.
Of paramount importance to this study’s hypothesis, however, is that even when
controlling for these other variables, the strength of a state’s gun laws has a statistically
significant impact on the trafficking of firearms across all the specifications in each of the
models. Again, these models are consistent across different ways of operationalizing the
dependent variable.
Table 3 presents two additional models. In this table, we utilize the data from the ATF on
all state-to-state gun flows for the two years in which the full data is available: 2012 and 2013.
Unfortunately, with only two years of data we cannot harness the benefits of a cross-sectional
time series model. Therefore, we run this data in two ways. In Model A (unconverted
independent and dependent variable) and B (variables converted to natural logs) we include both
years of data and include a control for the year (1=2013, 0=2012). This model does not include a
lag term. The second set of models (C and D), predict only the import ratio for 2013 but include
a lag of the import ratio using the 2012 data. Again, the models are run with clustered standard
errors for the state and include the full range of control variables. The results of the models in
Table 4 largely mirror those for the full time period. Across all of the models, the direction and
significance of our key independent variable—the strength of a state’s gun laws—supports our
hypothesis. States with stricter gun laws are far more likely to have a larger number of guns
found at crime scenes that were originally purchased in states with weaker gun laws and that
those states “send” fewer guns out-of-state.
[Table 3 about here]
14

Figure 1 presents the marginal effect of changes in gun regulations on the import ratio
using the 2013 data including a lag for the 2012 data. The figure demonstrates the change in
trafficking compared with relative levels of regulation. Of particular importance is that the
largest correlations of trafficking and regulation appear once regulation has surpassed a fairly
high threshold. These findings support Kwon and Baack’s (2005) assertion that rather than any
individual law being responsible for lowering the prevalence of gun violence, a state’s overall
gun control regulation climate may be more important.
[Figure 1 about here]
Robustness Tests
We also replicated the models using two different methodological strategies to check for
consistency across modeling decisions. These results are available in the supplemental online
appendix. First we employed a Standard Trade Model (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2003). In this
model, we predicted the natural log of the per capita number of guns imported controlling for the
natural log of the per capita number of guns exported (as well as a lag of imports and exports).
The gun regulation index remained highly statistically significant and positive.
Second, we replicated Model A of Table 2 using Arellano and Bond (2001) generalized
methods of moments (GMM) estimator to control for potential endogeneity (e.g. Roodman
2009). Arellano-Bond estimators are particularly good for models, such as ours, with a large N
(49 states) but a low T (7 years). We performed the GMM analysis using both the import ratio as
a dependent variable and the dependent variable and controls of the standard trade model. Both
of these models support our hypothesis with only minor changes in the size of the coefficient.
These results are available in the online supplemental appendix. The main findings of the

15

models are not changed with the addition of these controls. Given the consistency across
modeling strategies, we feel very confident in our results.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we evaluate the interstate dynamics of gun control in the United States. We
proposed that when states have markedly different approaches to regulating the availability of a
good, in this case guns, a single state’s attempt to diminish the presence of a good through
regulation may shift the market to states with considerably weaker regulations. We find
consistent evidence that this is the case in regard to firearms. Regardless of modeling approaches
or measurement decisions, our data suggest that states with more restrictive gun laws have a
higher share of their confiscated firearms originally purchased in states with weaker gun laws.
To put it succinctly, our models suggest that guns are frequently “exported” out of states with
weak gun control laws and “imported” into states with stronger gun control laws.
It is well known that state policies “spill over” into neighboring states and countries.
States, however, are also suggested to be involved in “competitive federalism” (e.g. Tiebout
1956), in which they attempt to retain residents based on making their policies fit the “demands”
of the community. However, a competitive federalism argument might also lead to states
intentionally or unintentionally undermining the attempts of neighboring communities to pass
and enforce policies that their local citizenry demands. Here we have investigated one such
possible context in which this might occur: gun sales.
Most people who have crossed state borders on a road trip can recall driving over a
border and being met with a series of stores selling a good that is not available or is more
regulated in the neighboring state. Entrepreneurs in New Hampshire have opened alcohol retail

16

outlets right on the Massachusetts boarder to harness income from Massachusetts residents who
face steep alcohol taxes. Likewise, when exiting Maryland into Virginia, you are likely to be met
with many stores advertising fireworks that are illegal in Maryland. States in these scenarios
benefit economically from their neighbors attempts to regulate supply of goods through
harnessing a shifting market. However, they also undermine the residents of the regulated states
who wanted laws to decrease the use of the regulated good. In this paper, we propose that the
regulations making purchasing a firearm more restrictive also may shift the market to out-ofstate suppliers and therefore undermine the state resident’s wishes for fewer guns. In terms of
competitive federalism, our data suggest that lower regulation states will “win” consistently over
states who wish to have regulations because the lower regulated states policies will override the
more regulated states. This conclusion calls into question the ability of people to “vote with their
feet” and escape an unwanted good if there is variation between state policies. Moreover, for
those who support gun control, our findings indicate that while states can make a meaningful
dent in the availability of unwanted guns in their state, regional or national gun control
legislation would significantly deter the shifting of markets to states easily crossed without
border enforcement.

17
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More imports
than exports

Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Change in Gun Control Index on the Import Ratio: 2013
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Note: Y axis is the Import Ratio. The X Axis represents the percentiles for the gun control index.
Margins are computed using the margins command in Stata on Model C of Table 5.
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Table 1. Importation and Exportation of State Gun Control Markets.
Top 5 Exporting States and Their ‘Customers’ for 2012
(Import Ratio) | {% of guns exported by the supply state} | [Gun control regulation index]
Supply State

#1 ‘Customer’

#2 ‘Customer’

#3 ‘Customer’

Indiana

Illinois

Kentucky

Ohio

(0.27) [4]

{63.3%} [26]

{7.4%} [2]

{7.2%} [7]

Arizona

Tennessee

Illinois

Texas

(0.27) [4]

{21.4%} [8]

{20.9%} [26]

{18.4%} [4]

West Virginia

Maryland

Ohio

North Carolina

(0.32) [4]

{26.1%} [43]

{16.4%} [7]

{12.4%} [16]

Mississippi

Illinois

Tennessee

Louisiana

(0.32) [4]

{27.8%} [26]

{21.2%} [8]

{16.2%} [2]

Virginia

Maryland

New York

North Carolina

(0.34) [12]

{21.2%} [43]

{20.4%} [52]

{14.1%} [16]

Top 5 Market States and Their ‘Suppliers’ for 2012
(Import Ratio) | {% of local guns provided by supply state} | [Gun control regulation index]
Market State

#1 ‘Supplier’

#2 ‘Supplier’

#3 ‘Supplier’

Connecticut

New York {6.4%}
[52]

North Carolina {4.6%}
[16]

Florida

New Jersey

Pennsylvania

North Carolina

Virginia

(25.21) [62]

{13.2%} [26]

{9.4%} [16]

{9.2%} [12]

Wisconsin

Illinois

Indiana

Mississippi

(10.45) [3]

{3.3%} [26]

{2.1%} [4]

{1.9%} [4]

Massachusetts

New Hampshire

Maine

Florida

(7.79) [49]

{12.9%} [6]

{7.2%} [7]

{4.5%} [5]

New York

Virginia

Pennsylvania

Florida

(7.74) [52]

{9.4%} [12]

{7.6%} [26]

{7.2%} [5]

(28.88) [55]

{3.4%} [5]

Note: This data is taken from the limited dataset which includes only the top 15 results for each state.
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Table 2. Predicting Gun “Imports” for years 2007-2013, Data Limited to Top 15 “Senders”
and “Receivers” For Each State
Dependent
Model A
Model B
Variable=Import
(2007-2013)
(2007-2013 natural logs)
Ratio
Lagged Import Ratio
0.695***
0.732***
(0.024)
(0.041)
Gun Control Index
0.031***
0.124**
(0.007)
(0.047)
Population (per 100k)
-0.003**
-0.0001
(0.001)
(0.001)
2
Size (per 1000 miles )
0.001
0.0001
(0.001)
(0.0004)
Percent Urban
0.816
0.434
(0.681)
(0.302)
Violent Crime Rate
-0.001*
-0.0001
(0.001)
(.0003)
Unemployment
-0.030
-0.016
(0.052)
(.021)
Percent in Poverty
0.031
-0.002
(0.032)
(0.014)
Prob>f
0.0000
0.0000
R-sq
.897
.759
N
294
294
Cons
-0.239
-0.472*
(0.578)
(0.278)
Note: *=p<.1 **p<.05 *** P<.01 Natural log models have natural logs for both the import ratio and the regulation
index; 49 states are included in the analysis. Only Hawaii is dropped because it has unique physical barriers to
trafficking which no other state enjoys, namely 2,300 miles of ocean. There is 7 years of data at this point for a total
of 343 observations. We lag a variable which eliminates the 2007 data from the dependent variable because there is
no 2006 for lagging purposes.
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Table 3. Predicting Gun “Imports” for Years 2012-2013 and 2013 with a Lag for
2012 Only for Accurate Data (All Senders and Receivers)
2012-2013 Data
2013 Controlling for 2012
Import Ratio
Dependent
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model D
Variable=Import Ratio
(2012-2013)
(2012-2013
(2013)
(2013
natural logs)
natural logs)
Lagged 2012 Import
N/A
N/A
0.063
0.526**
Ratio
(0.056)
(0.204)
Gun Control Regulation 0.036***
0.426***
0.016**
0.334**
Index
(0.011)
(0.104)
(0.006)
(0.136)
Population
Size
Percent Urban
Violent crime rate
Unemployment
Percent in Poverty
Manufacturing and
Licensing
Year 2013
Cons
N
Prob > F
R-Squared

2.17e-08
(1.82e-08)
-9.19e-07*
(5.97e-07)
0.916**
(0.353)
0.001
(0.001)
0.005
(0.063)
-0.011
(0.034)
0.023
(0.027)
-0.504***
(0.170)
-0.214
(0.399)
98
0.0000
.5124

2.16e-08**
(8.14e-09)
-9.45e-07
(8.16e-07)
2.666***
(0.657)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.073
(0.057)
0.039
(0.040)
0.052
(0.054)
-0.576***
(0.112)
-3.598***
(0.988)
98
0.0000
.6169

3.43e-08***
(1.23e-08)
3.43e-08
(7.71e-07)
0.353
(0.426)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.019
(0.064)
0.025
(0.028)
0.016
(0.408)
N/A

2.35e-08*
(1.41e-08)
-9.10e-07
(1.16e-06)
1.124
(1.069)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.102
(0.101)
0.099
(0.066)
0.057
(0.069)
N/A

-0.373
(0.408)
49
0.0000
.6710

-3.214***
(1.166)
49
0.0000
.6194

Note: *=p<.1 **p<.05 *** P<.01 Natural log models have natural logs for both the import ratio and the regulation
index. We excluded Hawaii from the models due to distance between the continental United States and Hawaii.
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Supplemental Appendix Table 1. Brady Campaign Gun Regulation Scores
To measure the strength of gun laws on a state-by-state basis, we utilize data from the Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. Since 2007, the Brady Campaign has collected a
“scorecard” for each state based on the strength of the state’s gun laws. As the Brady Campaign
evolved, its scorecard changed so that different types of gun laws were used in the scorecard
each year. In addition, the Brady Campaign weights its score based on an evolving standard of
which laws are considered more/less important. To deal with this, we tested three different
values which measure gun strength: (1) the raw score as provided by the Brady Campaign for
each state and each year. (2) Each year reweighted based on the weighting scheme applied in
2011 (the last year that it issued its scorecard in this format) and dropping any laws not tracked
over the entirety of the years measured. (3) An unweighted score in which each law in the 2011
weighted standard is calculated as 1, no individual law is assumed to have a greater or lesser
impact on gun trafficking than any other. As a result, while the original score was out of 100, the
reweighted scores have a maximum of 84. Our preferred measure is the weighted 2011 standard
because the intended result is that a state should have the same score in 2011 as it had in 2007 if
no changes in the law occurred. This method was employed to protect the analysis from being
skewed by changes in the scoring standard over time instead of changes in the law. We ran our
models using all three versions of the score (the original Brady Campaign score as reported for
each year, the 2011-base weight score, and an unweighted score). Here we show the difference
between the scoring mechanisms for a subset of laws to show how the scoring changes based on
the Brady Campaign’s weights. Again, the substance of the results was unchanged regardless of
if we used a weighed measure or an unweighted measure. Here we have chosen 6 gun laws to
exemplify the difference in the measures. In total there were 40 or so gun laws tracked by the
Brady campaign. The actual number of laws per year increases overtime however we kept only
those tracked every year for our measure. For information on all laws or how we converted each
law to match the Brady Campaign’s weights, please contact the authors.
Weighted Score
(2007 Standard)

Weighted Score
(2011 Standard)

Unweighted

Universal
Background Checks

17

17

1

One Handgun/month
purchase limit

10

5

1

Fingerprinting
required for permit

2

3

1

Safety training
required for permit

2

3

1

Gun Regulation

26

Under 16/17 access
prevention

5

2

1

Integrated locks sold
on all guns
(childproof)

3

5

1

State with all of
these gun laws gun
regulation score
would be:

39

35

6
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Supplemental Appendix Table 2. Standard Trade Models and GMM Models and for
2007-2013 Data
Standard Trade
GMM Models
Model
(Model A)
(Model B)
(Model C)+
Dep Var=Log
Dep
Dep
Number of Guns
Var=Import Var=Log of
Imported
Ratio
Number of
Guns
Imported
Lag of Log of Number of Imports
0.89***
-0.87***
(0.02)
(0.02)
Log of Number of Exports
0.02
-0.03
(0.02)
(0.02)
Lag of Log of Number of Exports
0.04**
-0.06**
(0.02)
(0.02)
Lagged Import Ratio
-0.28**
-(0.14)
Gun Control Regulation Index
0.002**
0.08**
0.004***
(0.0009)
(0.04)
(0.02)
Population
2.85e-09
--(2.19e-09)
Size
-9.00e-08
-1.19e-06
-2.92e-08
(7.44e-08)
(2.76e-06)
(8.02e-08)
Percent Urban
0.17**
0.96
0.18**
(0.066)
(1.86)
(0.09)
Violent crime rate
0.0001**
-0.001
0.0002**
(0.00001)
(0.001)
(0.00001)
Unemployment
-0.006
0.03
-0.01**
(0.006)
(0.09)
(0.00)
Percent in Poverty
-0.001
-0.13
0.002
(0.003)
(0.10)
(0.005)
Cons
0.14***
1.50
0.03
(0.07)
(1.47)
(0.06)
N
294
294
294
Prob > F
0.00
0.00
0.00
R-Squared
0.97
n/a
n/a
*=p<.1 **p<.05 *** P<.01
+
Standard Trade Model GMM
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Supplemental Appendix Table 3. Model in Table 1 with Regional Controls
Dependent Variable=Import Ratio

(2007-2013)

Lagged Import Ratio

0.230
(0.165)
0.094***
(0.023)
-1.46e-07***
(4.24e-08)
3.84e-06***
(1.40e-06)
6.69***
(1.87)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.037
(0.069)
0.128**
(0.055)
1.33***
(0.503)
2.71***
(1.01)
2.05***
(0.580)
110.34
0.0000
0.4384
294
-6.05***
(2.01)

Gun Control Regulation Index
Population
Size
Percent Urban
Violent Crime Rate
Unemployment Rate
Percent in Poverty
South
Northeast
Midwest
Wald chi 2
Prob>f
R-sq
N
cons
*=p<.1 **p<.05 *** P<.01
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Supplemental Appendix Table 4. Model in with Pop Change Variable
Dependent Variable=Import
Ratio
Lagged Import Ratio
Gun Control Index
Lagged Import Ratio (logged)
Gun Control Index (logged)
State Size
Percent of Urbanization
Violent Crime
Unemployment
Percentage in Poverty
Population Change
Constant
Observations
R2
F Statistic (df = 9; 284)
*=p<.1 **p<.05 *** P<.01

(2007-2013)
0.696***
(0.025)
0.025***
(0.007)
~
~
0.0001
(0.001)
0.360
(0.736)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.027
(0.060)
0.0004
(0.034)
-2.429
(7.636)
0.364
(00.588)
294
0.868
0.00
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(2007-2013
logged)
~
~
0.733***
(0.039)
0.124***
(0.041)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.409
(0.277)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.014
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.013)
1.056
(1.954)
-0.466**
(0.232)
294
0.758
0.00

Supplemental Appendix Figure 1. Bivariate relationship between Gun Control
Regulation Index and Percent of Guns Imported from other States

Note: Y Axis is percent of guns imported from other states, the X axis is the strength of a
state’s gun laws.
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Supplemental Appendix Figure 2. Distribution of Dependent Variable
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Supplemental Appendix Figure 3. Distribution of Logged Dependent
Variable
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